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Why did the transitions from state socialism to capitalism result in improved growth in some 
countries but significant economic declines in others? Three main arguments have been 
advanced: (1) the most successful countries rapidly implemented privatization, liberalization, and 
stabilization policies; (2) failures were unrelated to economic policies but occurred because of a 
poor institutional environment; and (3) the policies were counterproductive because they 
damaged the state. We present a state-centered theory which argues that the more radical the 
privatization program, the worse the subsequent performance. We agree with the second account, 
that institutions matter, but demonstrate that it was radical privatization itself which was a major 
determinant of institutional weakness. In addition, our account holds that privatization was in fact 
a crucial determinant of institutional failure, operating primarily through the creation of a massive 
shock to state revenues. We perform cross-national regressions for a sample of 30 countries 
between 1990 and 2000, and find that mass privatization programs negatively impacted economic 
growth, state capacity and property rights protection. These findings are corroborated with data 
from a random sample of 4,000 firms from 26 postcommunist countries. We show that in 
countries which implemented sizable mass-privatized programs, privatized firms were 
substantially less likely to engage in successful industrial restructuring but considerably more 
likely to engage in barter and have tax arrears than their state owned counterparts. 
 
 
Between 1989 and 1991, the Soviet empire disintegrated. Western-trained neoliberal economists 
provided the postcommunist policy elites with a blueprint for constructing capitalism amidst the 
ruins of communism. These economists developed the so-called “shock therapy” policy package, 
consisting of rapid and extensive privatization of state-owned enterprise, liberalization of prices 
and trade, and adoption of fiscal austerity programs (Greskovits 1998; Murrell 1996; Sachs 1994; 
UNDP 1999). Although sociologists criticized these policies on a series of grounds (e.g. Stark 
1992; Burawoy and Krotov 1992), there was widespread consensus among economists that rapid 
reforms were indeed needed. As Lawrence Summers put it, “Despite economists’ reputation for 
never being able to agree on anything, there is a striking degree of unanimity in the advice that 
has been provided to the nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU). The 
legions of economists who have descended on the formerly Communist economists have 
provided advice … [that] the three “ations” – privatization, stabilization, and liberalization – 
  1must all be completed as soon as possible” (1994: 252-253).
2 By the mid-1990s, most 
postcommunist countries had implemented some version of the shock therapy package, although 
there was considerable variation in the implementation of privatization policies.  
Despite the initial optimism surrounding these reforms, economic performance has been 
devastating in most postcommunist countries, as is evident from Figure 1. Between 1990 and 
1996, per capita income in Russia, as well as many other countries of the former Soviet Union 
(FSU), fell by over 30% (Rosefielde 2001) – slightly less than the decline the United States 
experienced during the Great Depression (see Appendix A for a graphical comparison). Yet, not 
all FSU countries fared as poorly. Estonia’s economy, for instance, after recording an initial 
20.2% drop in GDP between 1990 and 1994, fully recovered by 1997 and, by 2000, achieved 
29.3% higher per capita income levels than in 1990. Central and Eastern European countries 
(CEE), including Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, experienced the 
lowest declines in per capita incomes, bottoming out at roughly 10% in 1992. By 1994, the CEE 
countries surpassed pre-transition income levels, and for the next six years experienced balanced 
growth (recoding a 39.8% increase in per capita income between 1990 and 2000). What accounts 
for these substantial differences in economic performance? Before discussing the various 
explanations of this variation, we must review the initial theories of transition.   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
THEORIES OF ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
Neoliberal recommendations for transition were, above all else, grounded in the Smithian 
notion that economic development could be achieved by relying on the power of market forces 
and private property, unleashed by a radical curtailment of the state’s involvement in the 
                                                 
2 Indeed, as Kogut and Spicer (2005) show, a small subset of the debate contributions, mainly by economists at 
Harvard and the staff of the World Bank and IMF, were used to legitimate the neoliberal policy package (see also 
Wedel’s [2002] seminal account).  
  2economy. Neoliberal policy advisors argued that rapid liberalization of prices alongside 
privatization of ownership and macroeconomic stabilization (the “shock therapy” package) 
would set free economic restructuring in the postcommunist world, leading to growth and 
convergence with the West (Sachs 1994: 25). The European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development’s (EBRD) 1999 Transition Report succinctly sums up the consensus of foreign 
advisors and postcommunist policy elites at the start of the transition, “Private ownership would 
ensure profit-oriented corporate governance, while liberalization of trade and prices would set 
free the competitive market forces that reward profitable activities. Firms would have therefore 
[sic] both internal and external incentives to restructure” (1999: 167). 
Economically, neoliberal reforms would combine the advantage of “true prices” with “a fully 
private incentive structure,” thus promoting enterprise restructuring (EBRD 1999: 167; see also 
Sachs 1992a, 1996; Frydman, Gray and Rapaczynski 1996; Kosolowski 1992; Lipton and Sachs 
1990a; Fischer and Gelb 1991; Blanchard et al. 1993: 10-11; Carlin, van Reenen, and Wolfe 
1994: 72). Politically, these policies would destroy the strongest potential anti-reform coalition. 
Neoliberals expected that unless firms were privatized during the brief window of opportunity 
afforded by the period of “extraordinary politics” following the collapse of communism, 
managers and workers of state-owned enterprises would seek to halt, or even roll back, 
privatization and liberalization efforts in order to prevent lay-offs and other unpopular 
consequences of restructuring (Lipton and Sachs 1990b: 298; see also Frydman, Rapaczynski, 
and Turkowitz 1997: 84; Blanchard et al. 1991: xiv). As Sachs noted, “The need to accelerate 
privatization is the paramount economic policy issue facing Eastern Europe. If there is no 
breakthrough in the privatization of large enterprises in the near future, the entire process could 
  3be stalled for years to come. Privatization is urgent and politically vulnerable” (Sachs 1992b: 
71).  
The need for rapid privatization posed considerable practical challenges. While economists 
and policymakers have long understood how to stabilize and liberalize economies (i.e. by raising 
interest rates, limiting monetary emissions, freeing prices, and opening up trade), the attempt to 
privatize an entire economy within a few years was unprecedented, and doing so without an 
existing class of private investors seemed impossible at any rate. Competitive auctions were 
ruled out as a solution. As three senior World Bank bureaucrats involved in the implementation 
of mass privatization put it, “It quickly became apparent that the ‘Classical privatisation’ model 
practiced in the UK and New Zealand and emulated by other countries such as Mexico and 
Argentina would simply not work in the region. ... [T]here were too many state-owned 
companies … that needed to be privatised rapidly. Implementing privatisation on a case-by-case 
basis over many years risked missing the ‘window of opportunity’ for real structural change” 
(Lieberman, Kessides and Gobbo 2008).  
The policy solution to this challenge was called “mass privatization”. Rejecting the British-
style case-by-case method of privatization, mass privatization would give shares to firm insiders 
and citizens for nominal sums (or in many cases free of charge), legitimating the transition by 
giving all parties a stake in privatization while irreversibly shifting the economy toward private 
ownership (thus, creating a kind of “people’s capitalism”).
3 While most countries adopted 
                                                 
3 As two of the main advisors described the program’s differences from Western privatization: “We are advocating 
the rapid conversion of state enterprises into corporate form and the distribution of tranches of shares to various 
groups in the population, including workers, commercial banks, pension funds, and mutual funds. This strategy 
differs substantially from the standard methods of privatisation that have been used in the West: the sale of shares in 
an initial public offering and private placements to investor groups. The free distribution of shares helps to sidestep 
the difficult, costly, and time-consuming process of enterprise valuation, as well as the scarcity of financial capital in 
private hands in Eastern Europe. More importantly, corporatization combined with the free distribution of shares can 
occur quickly. Rapid privatisation is needed to combat the inevitable social, political, and economic problems 
associated with the lack of corporate governance” (Lipton and Sachs 1990b: 333). 
  4several different privatization strategies, as described in Appendix B, mass privatization 
programs were by far the most innovative, and were implemented by approximately half of the 
postcommunist world to varying degrees (see Appendix C).  
Mass privatization still encountered obstacles in the form of the institutional environment. 
Would privatization, implemented prior to restructuring and in the absence of capitalist 
institutions, be adequate to generate growth? Would there not be governance problems, 
information deficits, and potential market failures? The neoliberal answer to these questions was 
a kind of “political Coase Theorem”, asserting that a major benefit of rapid privatization was the 
creation of a multitude of private owners who would then lobby the government to establish 
market-supporting institutions. In what has become one of the most important neo-classical 
treatments of corruption, Shleifer and Vishny argue that, “Privatization then offers an enormous 
political benefit for the creation of institutions supporting private property because it creates the 
very private owners who then begin lobbying the government … to create market-supporting 
institutions…[Such] institutions would follow private property rather than the other way around 
“(1998: 10-11; our emphasis).  
While neoliberal ideas were influential in the formulation of actual policies, they were 
criticized from the beginning by “gradualists” voices, sometimes with an “institutionalist” or 
“statist” bent, from both economists well as many prominent sociologists (e.g. Murrell 1992; 
Burawoy and Krotov 1992; Stark 1992).
4 The gradualist position was that in the absence of a 
supportive institutional environment, radical reforms could actually be damaging. Privatization, 
for example, might lead to asset-stripping rather than investment, and rapid reforms might create 
                                                 
4 Burawoy critiques gradualism on the grounds that it takes the neoliberal endpoint to be correct. In his empirical 
critique of neoliberal policies, however, Burawoy’s position is clearly one of many institutionalist accounts of the 
transition, stressing the damage caused by reforms that strip away existing institutions without replacing them with 
anything (thereby causing “involution”).  
  5winners who then use their political power to engage in further predatory behavior. These 
scholars frequently cited the example of China as evidence of the benefits of a gradual, 
piecemeal approach to economic transition.  
Of course, the shock therapists won the initial policy debate in most cases. However, instead 
of general development throughout the postcommunist region, there was great economic decline 
followed by massive divergence in recovery and subsequent growth. How did scholars of the 
transition explain this variation?  
 
THE POST-MORTEM LITERATURE 
Both the gradualist and the shock therapists claimed that the hindsight experience of the 
postcommunist transition vindicated their initial positions, with two concessions from the shock 
therapists, namely, that institutions and other “initial conditions” matter. As Milton Friedman put 
it when reflecting on what went wrong in Russia, “It turns out that the rule of law is probably 
more basic than privatization. Privatization is meaningless if you don’t have the rule of law. 
What does it mean to privatize if you do not have security of property, if you can’t use your 
property as you want to?” (Friedman 2002: xviii). Shock therapy advocates now agreed with 
gradualists that other “initial conditions” also had a role to play in explaining the variation. That 
is, some countries, because of their particular historical and cultural legacies, would have either 
an easier or more difficult time restructuring their economies to be competitive on globalized 
markets.  
Despite these concessions, the shock therapists emphasized their original position, that faster 
and more extensive reforms lead to better performance, and therefore claimed that their initial 
theories were in no need of fundamental revision. Thus, variation in performance among the 
  6postcommunist economies could be explained based on a combination of initial conditions and 
the implementation of appropriate reforms. The seminal statement of this position was the 
EBRD’s 1999 Transition Report: Ten Years of Transition, which became part of a growing body 
of empirical evidence backing these claims (see also De Melo and Gelb 1996; Sachs 1996; De 
Melo, Denizer, and Gelb 1996; De Melo et al. 2001). This position tended to emphasize 
corruption as the primary factor in undermining reforms, especially in Russia (Åslund 1999). 
Other empirical work claimed that “the benefits of privatization are larger in countries with an 
effective legal framework and secure property rights” (IMF 2000: 105). Still, for the shock 
therapists, privatization is never viewed as detrimental, and countries are considered “better off 
after the flawed privatizations they carried out than they would have been had they avoided or 
delayed divestiture” (Nellis 2008: 81). Supporting this position, two recent econometric analyses 
claim that voucher privatization is beneficial to growth (Bennet et al. 2004; 2007). In sum, the 
original advocates who pushed for shock therapy would do so again: “No country has suffered 
from too radical reforms. Things have gone wrong because the move to the market was not 
radical enough” (Åslund 2002: 445). 
The gradualists also felt vindicated in their early position. The loudest voice was Nobel 
laureate Joseph Stiglitz. In his seminal “Wither Reform? – Ten Year of Transition” (2000), 
Stiglitz emphasized that prioritizing privatization over establishing a proper institutional 
framework created enormous opportunities for corruption, due to informational deficiencies and 
a lack of governance institutions. The owners of newly privatized companies thus had both the 
incentive and the opportunity to pursue in predatory rent-seeking and asset-stripping behavior. 
Stiglitz claimed that this tendency was be exacerbated by other neoliberal reforms, such as the 
decision to liberalize capital accounts, which made it easier to transfer money abroad, thereby 
  7increasing the attractiveness of asset stripping. Similarly, overly strict monetary policy (in the 
form of very high interest rates) made owners more likely to engage in asset stripping, as they 
found themselves unable to invest enough to be competitive. Unless accompanied by adequate 
institutional reforms, privatization could thus lead to lower economic growth.  
Other gradualists claimed that rapid liberalization generated supply shocks in industries that 
were “structurally distorted” during socialism by large subsidies and protection (Popov 2007). 
Rapidly eliminating subsidies and switching to market prices gave firms in these industries 
insufficient time to restructure, thus driving them out of business or into the barter economy. 
Because some investment capital would have been generated by the savings of these non-
competitive firms, had they remained protected, the overall level of investment capital 
plummeted. Thus, a slower liberalization would have maximized the level of investment and thus 
led to higher growth (Popov 2007).  
Prominent sociologists have advanced similar arguments, except they substituted the term 
“state” for “institutions.” In particular, Burawoy (1996) and Nee (2000) argued that the state’s 
bureaucratic capacity was a crucial factor in determining economic success or failure. In this 
respect, we consider their arguments to be quite close to those of institutionalists like Stiglitz and 
Popov. Burawoy (1996), in a seminal article comparing the transitions of China and Russia, 
argued that Russia performed poorly because neoliberal reforms damaged the state at the same 
time as the economy was being privatized, thereby creating the perverse combination of private 
property with soft budget-constraints. This resulted in what Burawoy termed “involution”, a 
process by which firms received subsidies from the state, but managers failed to use these 
resources to increase production, opting instead to continue asset stripping and wealth transfers 
  8out of the economy. Crucially though, the question of why neoliberalism destroyed the state in 
Russia but not Central Europe is left unanswered.  
A third position is that reforms did not matter at all (Stuart and Panayotopoulos 1999; Popov 
2000; Ganev 2007). Instead, the only thing that mattered was the starting point. Popov, for 
example, argues that democracy, without the rule of law, creates massive opportunities for 
corruption and will therefore undermine reform efforts. Others even have emphasized the 
importance social structural factors, in particular, the power of the former nomenklatura relative 
to other social groups. In those countries were the nomenklatura were sufficiently powerful, they 
were able to convert their social and political capital into private economic wealth (Eyal et al. 
1998; King 2003), and in the process “castrate the state” to cover their tracks (Ganev 2007). The 
outcome was a form of capitalism that is driven by the “wrong agents” with an inappropriate 
habitus (Eyal et al. 1998) That is, former nomenklatura were incentivized to export capital instead 
of investing in their enterprises, especially given that much of their wealth was obtained by illegal 
means and they could not be sure that they would be able to hold on to their property in the future.  
A variant on the social structural perspective stresses alliances between managers and foreign 
capital for successful firm restructuring (King 2000, 2001). Countries that managed to attract 
sufficient foreign direct investment (FDI) were able to compensate for the depressive effects of 
shock therapy on firms. Subsequent work combined this perspective with the policy argument 
that neoliberal policies are detrimental (King 2002; King and Szelenyi 2005; King and Sznajder 
2006), arguing that in some countries (e.g. Central Europe), an alliance of technocrats and 
cultural dissidents was able to block the nomenklatura’s bid to gain ownership of the means of 
production, and instead created the political and social conditions for large-scale foreign 
investment. In this perspective, FDI, combined with statist policies that facilitated enterprise 
  9restructuring, accounted for the success stories of the postcommunist world. Those countries 
where the nomenklatura struck a bargain with enterprise managers (e.g. Russia) effectively shut 
out FDI, and ultimately experienced de-modernization.  
While we believe these social structural explanations have substantial merit, they are 
nonetheless unable to account for difference in performance among countries with similar social 
structural conditions. More specifically, they cannot explain intra-FSU or intra-CEE variation. In 
this paper, we advance a neo-Weberian theory of postcommunist economic collapse that focuses 
on the bureaucratic character and capacity of the state. Our account is directly at odds with 
neoliberal explanations, since we argue that the closer the adopted policy was to the neoliberal 
ideal of privatization, the worse the performance of a country. Our explanation is consistent with 
the institutionalist and corruption-centered perspectives, but goes beyond them by arguing that 
rapid privatization itself damaged existing institutions and increased corruption. We contribute to 
the sociological statist and the social structural accounts by identifying one important mechanism 
responsible for the deleterious outcomes in many transition societies: mass privatization leading 
to declining state revenues. We do not claim mass privatization explains all variation in 
postcommunist performance, just a substantial amount.  
We argue that countries which pursued rapid privatization severely damaged their state 
capacity for two reasons. First, privatization removed assets from the state’s hands, including the 
profits of state-owned enterprises, thus reducing its revenue base. Second, it established 
enterprises which lacked strategic owners and thereby created severe agency problems, 
increasing the risk of firm failure and recourse to the non-monetary economy, thus further 
reducing potential tax revenues. In combination, these two effects on the state’s budget produced 
a fiscal crisis, weakening the development of the very institutions needed for governing the 
  10private sector, and undermining morale among the post-Soviet bureaucracy. Declining state 
capacity – fiscally and bureaucratically – caused corruption and weak institutions, which 
contributed significantly to poor economic outcomes. This created a vicious circle of mutual 
reinforcement between a failing state and a failing economy. We contrast this theoretical logic 
with the neoliberal account in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
The remainder of this paper is structured into four parts. In the first we develop our neo-
Weberian theory which forms the basis of our hypotheses. In the second and third we report the 
results of our country- and firm-level analyses, respectively. The final section discusses the 
implications of our findings for social theory and public policy.  
 
WEBER’S THEORY OF THE STATE IN MODERN RATIONAL CAPITALISM 
For Weber, modern rational capitalism was characterized not only by capitalist property 
relations, but by the presence of a strong bureaucratic state (Weber 1958a: 81; Weber 1958b: 
221). In this view, modern states hold a monopoly on legitimate violence within their territories, 
a monopoly on issuing money, and a monopoly on taxing the population. The bureaucratic nature 
of modern states is given by the separation of the office from the officeholder, and the use of 
formal rules in decision-making (Weber 1978). Therefore, the rights of the office as well as the 
material goods it commands cannot be used at the discretion of the officeholder for their own 
personal gain. Weber believed that bureaucracy functioned well when there was a highly 
educated staff with an established esprit de corps and sufficient material resources at their 
disposal. In speaking of a “strong” state, we then mean a state that has what Mann termed 
“infrastructural power” (1986): the ability to realize its goals. Mann distinguishes this from 
  11“despotic” power, or the scope of the commands the state can make. Thus, a dictatorship may 
have great despotic power since it can impose any law it might dream up, but nonetheless suffer 
from very low levels of infrastructural power. The reverse is true for most advanced 
industrialized nations, which are characterized by high infrastructural power but low despotic 
power.  
A bureaucratic state is essential to modern capitalism because in its absence, individual 
capitalists could resort to “political capitalism” – that is, the use of personal relationships in 
dealing with state officers to create extra-market opportunities for profitable activity (Weber 
1966: 246-247; 1978: 164-166). In this scenario, the mechanism which links capitalist 
production to ever-increasing efficiency (market dependence forcing constant innovation and 
specialization) is broken, and capitalists will attempt to pursue “political accumulation” instead 
(Brenner 1986). In addition, Weber recognized the essential role that strong nation-states played 
in supporting capitalist growth by protecting and nurturing infant industries. Many authors have 
emphasized the role of states, both historically and in the contemporary period, in supporting 
economic growth through the creation and maintenance of institutions that make modern 
capitalism possible (for a review see Block and Evans 2005). These include an adequate legal 
and regulatory framework, the provision of counter-cyclical demand stimulation, aid in the 
diffusion of reliable information, the promotion of a healthy and highly skilled workforce, and 
help in new technology development.  
  
The Direct Effects of Mass Privatization on State Capacity 
A post-socialist government’s choice to privatize its enterprise holdings quickly would 
immediately reduce that state’s financial capacity, due to the high budgetary dependence on the 
  12earnings of state-owned firms. Advocates of neoliberal policies did not expect this fiscal shock to 
be particularly devastating. First, it was believed that socialist states had been wasting vast 
amounts of resources due to inefficient planning and the production of unneeded and therefore 
“value-subtracting” goods (in the so-called “virtual economy”) (Gaddy and Ickes 1998). Thus, it 
was argued, radical reforms had the potential to generate large savings for the state. Second, 
rising tax revenues from the superior growth of de novo private firms and the gradually 
improving performance of privatized state firms would make up for the shortfall.  
 
Indirect Effects of Mass Privatization on State Capacity 
If the state was to avoid a financial crisis as a result of extensive privatization, the enterprise 
sector would therefore need to grow while also being taxed effectively. We argue that mass 
privatization accomplished the opposite: worse enterprise performance coupled with a declining 
capacity of the state to tax firms. In the following, we outline the mechanisms which contributed 
to this dual shock.  
Mass privatization programs, by design, led to greatly dispersed firm ownership, and thus 
significantly elongated principal-agent chains. That is, the new owners would only have limited 
incentive to monitor firms, and more importantly lack the capacity to exercise control over 
managers or employees (Ellerman 1998). McDermott (2002) demonstrated through case-studies 
in the Czech Republic that mass privatization greatly complicated corporate governance, causing 
assets to go unutilized because of an inability to agree on who owned them, and that this 
discouraged foreign investors.
5 While well functioning regulatory and credit rating agencies or 
                                                 
5 McDermott (2002) is part of a small literature that has criticized mass privatization on the grounds that it makes 
governance more difficult. Ellerman (1998; 2003) was the first to provide a theoretical argument for expecting a 
governance disaster to develop from mass privatization because of problems of monitoring agents. Spicer, 
McDermott, and Kogut (2000) provided evidence from several sector case studies in Hungary, Czech Republic and 
  13an independent business press could have mitigated the violation of shareholder rights, these 
institutions did not yet exist in the postcommunist world.  
At least initially, newly privatized firms were cut off from state resources, such as socialist-
era subsidies. Unlike firms privatized to strategic owners, however, they did not have access to 
crucial resources such as investment capital, new managerial talent, and marketing networks, 
which were needed for restructuring overstaffed and inefficient Soviet-era factories into 
enterprises capable of competing with western capitalist firms (King 2003). In this situation, 
owners, managers, and workers, unable to work cooperatively for the betterment of their firm, 
often pursued short-term, self-serving strategies to accumulate wealth. This typically involved 
substantial asset stripping (King 2003). Thus, firms that were oftentimes already technologically 
obsolete now faced substantial external shocks and additional internal problems. 
One way in which firms responded to these multiple crises was by reviving the practice of 
barter, which had evolved under the planning system to rectify deficiencies in the allocation of 
resources (Kornai 1980). As documented in David Woodruff’s (1999) definitive treatment of the 
subject, Money Unmade, failing postcommunist firms retreated to non-market mechanisms of 
exchange. They bartered. They tolerated arrears from their customers and in turn did not pay 
their suppliers, creating chains of inter-enterprise debt. They produced goods for the black 
market to avoid taxation, and oftentimes fell behind on tax payments for legally produced goods. 
Some firms even started using non-official money printed up by local governments. In effect, 
firms began to flout the government’s monopoly on the creation of money and the taxation of the 
economy. We refer to these micro-strategies as “non-market” restructuring, which we distinguish 
                                                                                                                                                             
Slovakia, while Spicer and Kogut (2002) provided substantial elite interview data from the Czech Republic and 
Russia, that show that mass privatization creates governance patterns that inhibit investment due to uncertainty over 
asset ownership.  Our theory can be seen as an extension of this work, offering systematic quantitative support for 
the basic proposition, and extending the theory to emphasize the fiscal effects of mass privatization.   
  14from the “rational capitalist” strategies of innovation, specialization and accumulation via 
increasing investment, developing new product lines, gaining quality accreditations, and 
increasing sales. These are the “market-oriented” restructuring activities typical of firms in 
Western capitalism. Obviously, non-market transactions are much harder to tax than market-
oriented strategies, which also tend to generate more economic value to be taxed in the future. 
Combined with non-payment of taxes, firm-level responses to mass privatization thus further 
strained the state’s resources.  
The resulting reduction in the state’s financial capacity also meant that the state was 
increasingly unable to pay its own staff. Government bureaucrats, being poorly paid, were easily 
corrupted, and frequently used their political connections to provide advantages to businessmen 
in exchange for bribes or other unofficial payments. (For the seminal descriptions how this 
process unfolded in Russia, see Pappe [2000] and Reddaway and Glinski [2001]). This creates 
what Szelenyi and his collaborators have termed “patrimonial capitalism” – a situation in which 
personal ties between economic and political actors replace bureaucratic organization (Eyal et al. 
1998; King and Szelenyi 2005).   
Based on the above considerations, we specify two sets of competing hypotheses to be tested 
at the cross-national and firm levels. Our own neo-Weberian theory suggests: 
H1: Mass privatization reduces state capacity 
H2: Mass privatization reduces economic growth 
H3: Mass privatized firms are more likely to use non-monetary exchanges and owe the 
government tax arrears; they are less likely to have pursued market-oriented restructuring 
than state-owned firms. 
Conversely, the neoliberal perspective holds:  
 
  15H4: Mass privatization increases state capacity.  
H5: Mass privatization increases economic growth.  
H 6: Mass privatized firms are less likely to use non-monetary exchange and owe government 
taxes and more likely to have pursued market-oriented restructuring than state owned firms. 
All hypotheses are single-tailed. In each case, the null hypothesis is specified as mass 
privatization having no effect on the response variable. 
 
QUANTITATIVE METHODS 
We present statistical findings from both national- and firm-level analysis. On the national 
level, we report time-series and cross-sectional models using data on the social, economic, and 
political development of 26 postcommunist countries, drawn from the World Bank World 
Development Indicators Database (2008 edition). Our firm-level data are taken from the World 
Bank/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS), a survey of 
over 4000 large and medium firms in 25 transition economies, conducted between 1999 and 
2000, that examines a wide range of interactions between firms and the state.
6 In addition, we 
generated a novel measure of mass privatization based on historical records, including those 
reported in the Transition Report series (EBRD 1994-2005). Table 1 summarizes the variables 
used in the cross-national models.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
                                                 
6 The survey is based on face-to-face interviews with firm managers and owners. It was designed to generate 
comparative measurements in areas such as corruption, state capture, lobbying, and the quality of the business 
environment; the survey also reports a series of specific firm characteristics and firm performance measures. The 
survey includes about 125 firms randomly sampled in each country, with larger samples for Poland and Ukraine 
(over 200 firms), and an even larger sample for Russia (over 500).  
 
  16Two variables require further discussion: our measures of privatization and of state capacity. 
The most important methodological innovation in this analysis is the creation of a dummy 
variable indicating whether a country implemented a sizable mass privatization program. Almost 
all analyses to date of privatization in the postcommunist world use the EBRD’s indices of 
privatization progress. While we will show that our results are robust to the use of these 
variables, the EBRD measures do not distinguish between different privatization methods. 
Moreover, there is clear evidence that they are biased in the direction of growth (Stuckler, King 
and Patton 2009).  
Our own measure is constructed to reflect as accurately as possible the actual implementation 
of large-scale mass privatization programs, by indicating whether a given country implemented a 
mass privatization covering at least 25% of its large enterprises. Ideally we would have used data 
on the rate of privatization for each country, as both the number of existing firms (denominator) 
and the number of privatized firms (numerator) were changing. However, inconsistencies in 
government reporting of privatization and firm data to international financial institutions made 
the calculation of a privatization rate impossible for many countries. According to staff members 
at the EBRD, the texts of its Transition Report series provide the entirety of the organization’s 
data on privatization, reporting the public and private sector shares in different ways: total assets 
of firms, total number of firms, and percent of total employment. All of these measures have 
advantages and disadvantages, but they are not commensurate. Appendix C reports the best 
estimate in each country. We confirmed the coding of our variable with the chief bureaucrat 
overseeing mass privatization implementation at the World Bank, Ira Lieberman, who agreed 
with our coding of countries’ privatization programs with the possible exception of Romania.  
  17Constructing valid and reliable measures of the bureaucratic nature of the state or of state 
capacity is notoriously difficult. We use a variety of subjective measures of state capacity 
aggregated from firm-level survey data (perception of government efficiency, property rights 
enforcement and contract security, and prevalence of corruption), as well as an objective 
measure for the time-series analysis (total government spending). Comparative studies frequently 
measure state capacity by expressing government spending as a percentage of GDP. This is 
sensible, but it assumes that there are no significant changes in the denominator during the period 
under investigation; given the significant economic contraction experienced by most countries in 
the postcommunist world, this assumption is not reasonable for the purpose of our study. In 
Russia, for instance, changes in the ratio of government spending to GDP were driven partially 
by deliberate attempts to reduce the size of government, but primarily by the inability of the state 
to collect taxes and the rise of the shadow economy (Popov 2004: 2). 
 
CROSS-NATIONAL EVIDENCE  
Cross-Sectional Results 
We first tested the effects of mass privatization on a series of state capacity indicators at the 
country level using cross-sectional survey data. Our basic model is as follows: 
STATECAP i = α + β1PRIVi + β2LIBi + β3DEM i + β4OILi + β5WAR i + β6URBANi + 
β7HIGHEDi + β8FSUi + β9INITGDPi + εi 
STATECAP refers to our subjective state capacity indicators; PRIV is our measure of 
privatization; LIB is the EBRD index of price liberalization; DEM is the Freedom House index 
of democratization; OIL is the dummy for the presence of oil; URBAN is the rate of 
urbanization; HIGHED is the tertiary education enrollment rate; WAR is a dummy for the 
  18occurrence of military or ethnic conflict; INITGDP is the level of GDP at the start of transition; 
and ε is the error term.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 2 shows the results of our regressions of three subjective indicators of a strong 
bureaucratic state on mass privatization and the above controls. We found that the aggregated 
survey respondents from countries which undertook mass privatization exhibited a higher 
probability of believing that the government was inefficient (Model 1), would not protect 
property rights or contracts (Model 2), and would be more prone to rely on unofficial payments 
to public officials (Model 3) after correcting for other transition policies, resource wealth, 





Our basic time-series models are as follows: 
(1) GOVSPEND1990 i,t = α + β1PRIVi,t + β2LIBi,t + β3DEMi,t + β4OILi,t + β5WARi,t + 
β6INITGDPi,t + εi,t 
(2) GDP1990i,t = α + β1PRIVi,t + β2LIBi,t + β3DEMi,t + β4OILi,t + β5WARi,t + β6INITGDPi,t + εi,t 
                                                 
7 Our inferences are implicitly based on the assumption that state capacity was generally much higher prior to the 
transition to capitalism. We cannot test this proposition for our subjective measures of state capacity with time-series 
data, because they only exist for one year, 1999. The World Bank provides a database of governance indicators for 
1996 onwards, but these are unusable for two reasons. First, all mass privatization programs had been completed by 
1996, and, second, Kurtz and Schrank (2007) have shown these measures to be invalid. Our assumption, that state 
capacity was higher before the transition, reflects that “a consensus has coalesced around the viewpoint that the 
transformative processes unleashed in 1989 precipitated a rapid and radical weakening of state structures” (Ganev 
2007: 1). Popov (2004) summarizes the available statistical evidence for Russia, clearly demonstrating that state 
capacity collapsed during the transition. While there had been some variation in state capacity during the late-
communist period, we do not believe it can account for the subsequent divergent patterns. Our measures of initial 
GDP and level of education most likely capture much of this difference in overall state capacity, and these are 
controlled for in the basic model. There are a few subjective measures of state capacity available for early points in 
the transition (1990), but unfortunately they are not commensurate with our 1999 measures. We analyze the 1990 
data below in the section on endogeneity.   
  19Here i is country and t is year. GDP1990 [GOVSPEND1990] is the current year’s GDP in 
constant 2000 US dollars [government spending in constant 2000 dollars], expressed as a 
percentage of the 1990 level of GDP per capita [the 1992 level of government spending]; PRIV 
is our measure of privatization; LIB is the EBRD index of price liberalization; DEM is the 
Freedom House index of democratization; OIL is the dummy for the present of oil, and WAR is 
a dummy for the occurrence of military or ethnic conflict; INITGDP is the level of GDP at the 
start of transition; and ε is the error term. 
We first analyze the entire sample of countries (Table 3). However, given the historical 
differences between the satellite countries and the core countries of the FSU, we also analyzed 
the non-FSU and FSU blocks of countries separately (see Tables 4 and 5 below). We restricted 
our analysis to the years between 1990 and 2000. The 1990 starting point is sensible, given 
missing data issues for many countries in 1989 (several post-Soviet countries also did not yet 
exist). By the late 1990s, the transitional recession was over in all countries throughout the 
postcommunist world, and a new set of political and economic dynamics emerged to create what 
Szelenyi and Wilk (2009) have termed the “Second Transition.” While there has been substantial 
path-dependence in the region, this dependence is not absolute, and both political and economic 
change is increasingly driven by other factors – for instance, the change in relative prices after 
the Russia’s sovereign debt default in 1998, or the strong rise in oil and other commodity prices 
from the late 1990s onwards. We therefore end the time series in 2000, although extending it did 
not affect our results. We clustered our standard errors by country to reflect non-independence of 
sampling, and to make statistical inferences unbiased to serial correlation in the data. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
  20Table 3 reports our regression results for the full sample of countries. We can see that 
countries that implemented a mass privatization program, ceteris paribus, exhibited nearly 27% 
lower government spending than non-mass privatizing countries (Models 5-6). Countries that 
liberalized prices also displayed substantially lower levels of government spending. Did this 
decline have a negative effect on economic development? Because government spending is a 
component of GDP, we would expect to find that GDP dropped by the amount attributable to 
mass privatization multiplied by the fraction of government spending in GDP. We find that 
mass-privatizing countries experienced, on average, a more than 16% decline in GDP per capita 
(Models 8-9). Price liberalization had a similar negative effect, corroborating a finding by Popov 
(2007). 
 [Insert Table 4 here]  
Table 4 presents the results of our regressions of government spending on mass privatization 
using the split sample. We found that in former FSU countries mass privatization was associated 
with a 26.3% drop in real government spending per capita during the 1992-2000 period for 
which comparative data were available (Model 12). Not surprisingly, oil is associated with 
greater government spending (this is capturing the spike in oil prices in the late 1990s). 
Similarly, greater democratization was associated with an increase in government spending per 
capita of 5.36% on average among FSU countries (p = 0.008) but had no effect among non-FSU 
countries (β = -1.87, p = 0.68). We found no statistically significant effect for mass privatization 
in the non-FSU countries once controls were implemented (Model 15). However, price 
liberalization had a negative effect in the non-FSU region. Given that the average increase in the 
liberalization score for these countries from 1990-2000 was 1.97 (range 0-4), this is a substantial 
effect.  
  21 [Insert Table 5 here] 
Table 5 shows the results of our random-effects regressions of real GDP per capita on mass 
privatization. We find that privatization was associated with a 13.1% drop in real GDP per capita 
(Model 18), which is consistent with the notion that the major negative effect of mass 
privatization on growth operated through a reduction in state capacity, without a simultaneous 
compensation in benefits to investment, consumption or exports. When we held constant trends 
in government spending, effectively blocking the mass privatization-state capacity-growth 
channel, we found no effect of mass privatization on growth among FSU countries (β=-5.01, 
p=0.24; results not reported).  
 
Robustness Checks 
We performed a series of robustness checks on our cross-national findings. First, we 
removed potential outliers according to a liberal definition of standard deviations in the residuals 
of greater than |2| (dropping Armenia in 1992, 1993, and 2000; Azerbaijan in 1992; Georgia in 
1991 and 1994; and Tajikistan in 1991), finding that the coefficients for mass privatization 
increased (β=-17.2, p<0.001). Second, we introduced a set of country dummies, finding that our 
coefficients for mass privatization were unchanged. Third, we replicated our cross-national 
results using the EBRD index of privatization, with the results being consistent with the findings 
reported in Table 5 (Web Appendix, Table W2). Thus, the cross-national evidence supports our 
neo-Weberian theory linking mass privatization to declines in state capacity.  We now proceed to 
test our hypotheses using evidence from the firm level.  
 
FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE 
  22For the micro-analysis we adopt the modeling strategy used in King (2000) and King and 
Sznajder (2006). That is, we consider multiple indicators of firm performance and control for 
variables commonly used in firm-level analysis, all of which are summarized in Table 6.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
If a firm was privatized in a country that we coded as having implemented a mass 
privatization program, and this firm reported no foreign investment, we treat this firm as having 
been privatized via mass privatization. This creates a conservative bias in the variable, as many 
such firms were not in fact privatized by this method (see Appendix C). Firms privatized by 
other methods likely suffered from much less severe principle-agent problems (e.g. if they were 
privatized only to firm insiders), or at least had access to new capital and markets (e.g. if they 
had a strategic owner). We employ the following basic model: 
Firm Performance i = α + β1PRIVi + β2FDI i + β3-19 [controls] i + εi 
Table 7 presents our results. It is apparent that non-foreign invested firms privatized in 
countries that implemented mass privatization programs were 66% more likely to engage in 
barter (Model 22) and 47% more likely to have overdue taxes (Model 30) than state-owned 
firms. They were also 39% less likely to have made an investment (Model 24), 38% less like to 
develop a new product (Model 32), 28% less likely to upgrade existing products (Model 34), 
47% less likely to hire new employees (Model 28), and 37% less likely to have increased sales 
(Model 26). Conversely, foreign-invested firms were 61% less likely to have engaged in barter 
(Model 22) and 52% less likely to have owed taxes (Model 30). Our micro-level findings are 
thus consistent with those from the cross-national analysis.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
  23Endogeneity  
It is conceivable that our results are misleading because of a “sick patient” effect. That is, 
countries with weak states might have chosen mass privatization because they did not have the 
capacity to implement any other method of privatization. If these countries were going to suffer 
negative consequences regardless of their privatization strategy, the detrimental effects we 
attribute to mass privatization might simply be the result of an underlying lack of state capacity 
and thus be unrelated to the method of privatization.  
First, even if this were true, our findings still show that mass privatization contributed to a 
further weakening of these states via enterprise failure and reduced tax revenue. That is, while 
weak states might have been more likely to use mass privatization, choosing this method 
inflicted further damage on their states (as can be inferred from our firm-level analysis). Second, 
we believe, and the leading historical accounts agree, that privatization strategies were politically 
motivated, and were the product of political conflict among domestic elites. Significantly, the 
choice to mass privatize was not predetermined by a weak state or any other structural feature 
(for Russia see Reddaway and Glinski 2001; Klebnikov 2000; Medvedev 2000). After all, mass 
privatization was adopted by countries in every region of the postcommunist world, from the 
authoritarian states of Central Asia, to the “managed democracies” of the European part of the 
former Soviet Union, to the liberal democracies of Central Europe.  
A majority of scholars familiar with privatization strategies in the postcommunist world 
agree that the overriding motive for mass privatization was to smash the political power of the 
communist party and make the transition irreversible; it was not chosen because the state lacked 
the capacity to implement alternative privatization methods. Indeed, it surely would have been 
easier to leave large enterprises under state ownership until a strategic owner emerged, as 
  24governments did in Belarus and Uzbekistan. Furthermore, notions of historical causality in which 
policy decisions are strictly determined by structural forces fell out of sociological favor decades 
ago. Virtually the entire field of political and historical sociology places a strong emphasis on 
contingency and agency in explaining historical outcomes (see e.g. Clemens 2007). To posit that 
a radical and innovative privatization program was inevitable strikes us as implausible. 
Nonetheless, we investigated this possibility statistically by testing whether a range of commonly 
used “initial conditions,” including four measures of state capacity, are associated with the 
adoption of mass privatization programs (see Appendix D, Table D1). The only statistically 
significant finding relates to government transparency and points in the opposite direction. These 
findings are consistent with our understanding of privatization as a political decision, driven 
primarily by the aim of legitimizing new regimes or weakening the power base of opponents.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Based on country- and firm-level evidence, our analysis shows that rapid privatization 
negatively affected state capacity via two mechanisms. We found that mass privatization directly 
weakened the state’s revenue base, and that this decline was not offset by enterprise growth 
because, as we show, mass privatization also had negative effects on the enterprise sector, such 
as increasing the risk of barter, unofficial payments to public officials, government inefficiency 
and insecure contract and property rights. These findings contrast with the neoliberal prediction 
that rapid privatization would both promote firm restructuring and combat weak corporate 
governance, ultimately leading to stronger growth. They are, however, consistent with the 
leading post-mortem explanations (by both economists and sociologists) that weak institutions 
and poor governance were major causes of the postcommunist economic recession. Our model 
  25goes beyond this understanding by showing that the capacity of postcommunist states, itself 
determined by policy choices, played a crucial role in determining economic success or failure. 
Thus, while we agree with sociological work emphasizing the centrality of the state, we are 
isolating the fiscal effects of rapid privatization as a key mechanism that brings about poor 
economic and political performance.  
Our results also support the gradualists and statist critiques of rapid liberalization, and the 
social structural analyses emphasizing FDI. Though not a central focus of this paper, in many of 
our models, the EBRD liberalization index had a large negative effect on both government 
spending and GDP growth. These negative results are stronger than they might appear, since 
there is clear evidence that the liberalization efforts of better-performing countries were “over-
coded” (Stuckler, King and Patton 2009).  
There also seems to be some evidence for the beneficial effects of FDI in the micro-data: 
foreign-invested firms bartered less and paid their taxes more promptly than domestic-owned 
companies, and in non-mass privatizing countries they were more likely to make investments 
than their domestic-owned counterparts. Including FDI as a percent of GDP into the regression 
models had no effect (results not reported), as foreign investment was simply not prevalent 
enough in mass-privatizing countries to make a difference. Indeed, mass privatization was 
viewed by its designers as an alternative to waiting for foreign investors, who were expected to 
be hesitant to invest in gigantic Soviet-era combines during a time of considerable political 
uncertainty. Thus, the decision to mass privatize was at the same time a decision not to rely on 
FDI.  
The most important outlier of the postcommunist world, that is, the country that implemented 
mass privatization according to our definition but also had good overall performance and 
  26managed to attract a large amount of FDI, is the Czech Republic. However, this is the exception 
that proves the rule. The Czech Republic was the second-richest country in the region, owed 
little external debt, had a long and celebrated history of industrial production stemming from its 
time as the economic powerhouse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, had a legal tradition of 
contract and property rights, and had a privileged geographic location bordering Germany. Still, 
by 1999, the Czech Republic recorded the worst scores on the protection of property rights, 
government effectiveness, and the rate of growth within Central Eastern Europe. Case-study data 
moreover demonstrates that companies privatized through vouchers experienced substantial 
governance problems (McDermott 2002; King 2001), and many voucher-privatized firms were in 
fact renationalized before ultimately being sold to foreign investors.  
As our findings show, mass privatization programs damaged the enterprise sector, and, in 
doing so, indirectly weakened the bureaucratic character of the state and thus its ability to 
support the institutions necessary for a functioning capitalist economy. “Telescoping” the 
formation of private property led to state withdrawal, and in fact had the opposite effect of what 
was intended by the advocates of mass privatization. Rather than securing a smooth transition to 
Western-style capitalism, it pushed countries in the direction of “crony” or “political” capitalism. 
A large and growing body of empirical evidence shows that a different type of capitalism, 
emphasizing patron-client ties and a non-bureaucratic state, emerged in parts of the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, countries that proceeded more gradually in 
creating a private sector, such as Poland and Slovenia, are now much closer to the Western 
capitalist ideal, with a relative separation of politics and economics (for details, see the literature 
review in King and Szelényi 2005). To be sure, we are not claiming that mass privatization is the 
only path to postcommunist patrimonialism. Yet by strongly contributing to a fiscal crisis and 
  27creating severe governance problems, mass privatization clearly provided a fertile ground for 
activities conducive to patrimonialism (e.g. funneling of assets, official corruption, solicitation of 
kick-backs, privatizing of the means of administration, etc). 
Our results do not indicate that mass privatization was the only determinant of 
postcommunist economic performance. We are, however, claiming that it explains a substantial 
amount of the variation in performance. Future analysis might arrive at a more differentiated 
picture by relying on improved measures of other types of transition policies (e.g. price and trade 
liberalization). Undoubtedly, external factors, such as relative prices, are causally important as 
well. Finally, as sociologists we never doubted that “initial conditions” are important. We do not 
pretend to test for the relative effects of different policies, external factors and initial conditions 
in any systematic way, but only to seek to provide rough controls for our variable of interest, 
mass privatization.  
Our findings have several theoretical and policy implications. For social theory, our analysis 
supports the position that states and markets are not antagonistic entities as maintained by the 
neoliberal perspective (Block 1994; Evans 1995; Fligstein 2001; Block and Evans 2005). It also 
supports the traditional sociological thesis of the importance of a bureaucratic state for successful 
capitalist development (e.g., Weber 1978; Evans 1995; Evans and Rauch 1999). Regarding 
public policy, our analysis suggests that when designing major economic reforms, particularly 
those emphasizing private sector development, safe-guarding government revenues and state 
capacity ought to be a high priority. Counting on a future burst of productivity from a 
“restructured” private economy to compensate for declining tax revenues emerges as a risky 
proposition, given the postcommunist experience.  
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Privatization is likely to remain a salient issue in coming years. As three senior World Bank 
officials note in a recent volume on privatization in transition economies, “What still amazes 
many of us who worked on privatization throughout this period in the transition countries is how 
quickly the transformation happened. However, there is more to do with respect to privatization 
in many countries in the region and transition economies elsewhere in the world” (Lieberman, 
Kessides and Gobo 2007: 59).  REFERENCES 
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Notes: Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) include Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Former Soviet countries (FSU) for which data are available 
since 1990 include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Percentage 
changes are scaled to GDP per capita in 1990 using constant 2000 international dollars as 
reported in the April 2008 edition of the World Bank World Development Indicators database.FIGURE 2. EFFECTS OF RAPID PRIVATIZATION ON FIRMS, THE STATE AND GROWTH 
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Failure VARIABLES USED IN CROSS-NATIONAL REGRESSIONS 
 
Variable Description  Source 
Response variables    
  Government efficiency  How would you rate the efficiency of the 
government in delivering services? (q48b) 
BEEPS 
  Weak contracts  To what degree do you agree with this 
statement? “I am confident that the legal 
system will uphold my contract and property 
rights in business disputes”. (q23a) 
BEEPS 
  Unofficial payments  On average, what percent of revenues do firms 
like yours typically pay per annum in 
unofficial payments to public officials? (q27) 
BEEPS 
  Real government spending  Government spending in constant 2000 
dollars, expressed as a percentage of 1992 
spending 
WDI 
  Real GDP per capita  GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars, 
expressed as a percentage of 1990 GDP per 
capita 
WDI 
Explanatory variables    
  Mass privatization  Dummy variable indicating mass privatization 
programs covering at least 25% of large 
enterprises; see Appendix C for coding 
Authors’ coding 
  Price liberalization  EBRD index of price liberalization  EBRD 
  Democratization  Cumulative civil liberties and political rights 
score 
Freedom House 
  Oil  Presence of oil  Authors’ coding 
  War  Military or ethnic conflict  Authors’ coding 
  Urbanization  Urban population as a percentage of total 
population 
WDI 
  Education  Tertiary education gross enrollment rate  WDI 
  Former Soviet Union  Dummy indicating whether a country was part 
of the Former Soviet Union 
Authors’ coding 
  Initial GDP per capita  Level of GDP in 1990  WDI 
Notes: EBRD is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; WDI is the World Bank World 
Development Indicators database (2005 and 2008 editions); BEEPS is the World Bank/EBRD Business 
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TABLE 2 
EFFECT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION ON SUBJECTIVE MEASURES OF STATE CAPACITY 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Govt. efficiency  Poor Property Rights  Unofficial payments 































































Observations 23  23  23 
R
2 0.644  0.663  0.589 
95% confidence intervals in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001TABLE 3 
EFFECT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION ON REAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING PER CAPITA AND REAL GDP 
PER CAPITA, 1990-2000 (FULL SAMPLE) 
 
  Government spending    GDP per capita 
   (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
















































































































Country-year trends  No No  Yes    No No Yes 
Nation-years 288  287  287    253  253  253 
Nations 24  24  24    25  25  25 
R
2 0.094  0.373  0.352    0.108  0.453  0.407 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling; 
random effects models presented, controls for country-specific fixed effects do not change the coefficient on mass 
privatization (Hausman-Taylor χ
2(1) = 1.18, p=0.28). Real government spending per capita is expressed as a 
percentage of 1992 government spending. Real GDP per capita is expressed as a percentage of 1990 GDP. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   41
TABLE 4 
EFFECT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION ON REAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING PER CAPITA, 1990-2000  
(SPLIT SAMPLE) 
 
 FSU    non-FSU 
    (10)  (11) (12)    (13)  (14) (15) 














































































































Country-year  trends  No  No Yes    No  No Yes 
Nation-years  175  175 175    113  112 112 
Nations 15  15  15    9  9  9 
R
2  0.002  0.514 0.807    0.049  0.281 0.632 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling; 
random effects models presented, controls for country-specific fixed effects do not change the coefficient on mass 
privatization (Hausman-Taylor χ
2(1) = 1.18, p=0.28). Real government spending per capita is expressed as a 
percentage of 1992 government spending. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001TABLE 5 
EFFECT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION ON REAL GDP PER CAPITA, 1990-2000 (SPLIT SAMPLE) 
 
   FSU    non-FSU   
   (16)  (17)  (18)    (19)  (20)  (21) 






































































































Country-year trends  No  No  Yes    No  No  Yes 
Nation-years 150  150  150    103  103  103 
Nations 15  15  15    10  10  10 
R
2-within 0.202  0.605  0.735    0.002  0.536  0.586 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling; 
random effects models presented, controls for country-specific fixed effects do not change the coefficient on mass 
privatization (Hausman-Taylor χ
2(1) = 1.18, p=0.28). Real GDP per capita is expressed as a percentage of 1990 
GDP. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001TABLE 6 
VARIABLES USED IN FIRM-LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS 
 
Variable  Description / Survey Question  Coding 
Dependent variables    
  Barter  What share of your firm’s sales are now 
conducted in barter, offsets or bills of 
exchange (money surrogates)? (q67a) 
0 = No Barter 
1 = Barter 
 Investment 
Increased 
By what percentage has your investment 
increased/decreased over the past three years? 
(q50c/q50d) 
0 = Investment 
Decreased/Stayed the 
Same 
1 = Investment 
Increased 
  Sales Increased  By what percentage have your sales 
increased/decreased over the past three years? 
(q50c/q50d) 
0 = Sales 
Decreased/Stayed the 
Same 
1 = Sales Increased 
 Employment 
Increased 
By what percentage has your employment 
increased/decreased over the past three years? 
(q50c/q50d) 
0 = Employment 
Decreased or Stayed 
the Same 
1 = Employment 
Increased 
  Overdue taxes  Is the amount of payments overdue (by more 
than 90 days) by your company to government 
taxes substantial, manageable, modest or non-
existent? (q53a) 
0 = non-existent 
1 = substantial. 
manageable, or 
modest 
 New  Product 
development 
Has your company undertaken the successful 
development of major new product line in the 
last three years? (q54) 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
  Product upgrade  Has your company undertaken the successful 
upgrading of existing product line in the last 
three years? (q54) 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
Explanatory variables    
  Privatized  Dummy variable indicating firm was 




  Foreign  Dummy variable indicating foreign ownership  0 = <100% foreign 
ownership 
1 = 100% foreign 
ownership TABLE 6 (CONTINUED) 
VARIABLES USED IN FIRM-LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS 
 
Variable  Description / Survey Question  Coding 
  Sector Dummies  Dummy for firm sector, including agriculture, 
manufacturing, mining, construction, trade, 
retail, transport, finance, power and other 
sectors. 
0/1 
  Firm age  In what year was your firm founded? (q6)  Age 
  Technology  Dummy for whether firm has internet access 
(qS.17) 
0 = No access 
1= Access 
  Size  Scale of full-time employees, ranging from 1 
(1-9) to 7 (500 or more) (qS.5) 
Number 
 Size
2  Squared scale of full-time employees, ranging 
from 1 (1-9) to 7 (500 or more) 
 
  Large  Dummy for >200 employees  0 = <200 employees 
1 = ≥200 employees 
 Firm  receives 
subsidies 
Does your enterprise receive subsidies 
(including tolerance of tax arrears) from local 
or national government (q65a) 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 New  General 
Manager 
Dummy for whether there had been a change 
in the general manager within the last three 
years (q8). 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 Domestic 
monopoly 
Dummy for whether firm has 100% of market 
share (q61) 
0 = <100% market 
share 
1 = 100% market 
share 
Source: World Bank/EBRD Business Enterprise and Environment Performance Survey, 1999/2000. 
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TABLE 7 
FIRM-LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS RESULTS 
 
  Barter   Investment   Sales 
  (22) (23)    (24) (25)    (26)  (27) 































































































































































































































































Observations  1936 1742    1945 1723    1948  1739 
Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
  45TABLE 7 (CONTINUED) 
FIRM-LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS RESULTS 
 
  Employment    Overdue taxes    Prod. development 
 (28)  (29)    (30)  (31)    (32)  (33) 









































































































































































































































































Observations 1947  1710    1917  1730    1952  1771 
Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
  46TABLE 7 (CONTINUED) 
FIRM-LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS RESULTS 
 
 Prod.  upgrade 
 (34)  (35) 





















































































Observations 1952  1771 
Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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  48APPENDIX B. METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION 
 
There were eight different ways in which this privatization was actually accomplished. All 
countries employed a mix of these methods. 
  
(1) VOUCHERS OR COUPONS. These were programs that distributed “vouchers” or “coupons” 
to the adult citizenry which can then be used to purchase enterprises during privatization 
auctions. Their face value was much greater than their cost to the public. This was the 
major method in Russia and the subject of this empirical analysis. 
(2) COMPETITIVE AUCTIONS. This typically occurred after a period of active restructuring. 
Some form of foreign ownership was often a natural outcome of this method (since they 
would be expected to win a large percentage of fair auctions because of their capital and 
experience). This was the modal form employed in Hungary and Poland (see King and 
Sznajder 2006).  
(3) NON-COMPETITIVE AUCTIONS. In many instances politically connected businessmen are 
able to privatize enterprises via rigged auctions. In such cases, the price paid for the 
enterprise is incredibly low. This was the modal form of Russia’s raw materials sector in 
the now infamous “Loans for Shares” program in which the crown-jewels of the Russian 
economy, its oil and metals firms, were privatized by oligarchs in exchange for media 
and political support for Boris Yeltsin’s 1996 re-election bid (see King and Treskow 
2006 for details). 
(4) MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE BUYOUTS (MEBO). Perhaps the most common form of 
privatization overall was management and employee buyouts. There were a variety of 
ways of accomplishing this transfer, but it almost always involved substantial discounts 
to enterprise insiders. In most cases, management or some outside owners would 
centralize the shares of the workers by slowly buying them up. Sometimes there would 
use lease-to-own arrangements, where managers and employees would lease the 
enterprise from the state until they paid an amount that made them its owners.  
(5) EMPLOYEE-SHARE OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS (ESOP). These are employee shared 
ownership schemes in which the employees gain ownership of the firm. Unlike ordinary 
management and employee buyouts however, there is a legal devise that centralizes the 
ownership and voting of the workers. This is crucial, since it guarantees actual worker 
control. These were very rare throughout the postcommunist world, and were mostly 
prohibited in practice in Russia.  
(6) FOREIGN INVESTMENT. Foreign investment can take the form of portfolio purchases, 
where by a company is listed on a foreign stock exchange as an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO). Most foreign investment took the form of foreign direct investment (FDI), where a 
foreign firm purchases a company and controls it. This is typically the outcome of fair 
auctions, but can also be accomplished in other ways. There can be a formal or informal 
preference for FI (such as in Estonia, where FI was sought as a hedge against Russian 
domination). There can be FDI via closed tender, where the process isn’t transparent but 
negotiated between the government and foreign buyer behind closed doors. FDI is the 
dominant method in Hungary and CEE more generally. FDI can also take the form of 
joint ventures with state owned enterprises (this is very common now in China).  
(7) CROSS-OWNERSHIP. Here, firms are allowed to purchase the shares of other firms, which 
in turn purchase the shares of their new owners. The result is a system of cross-
  49institutional ownership where a group of firms own themselves. This in practice means 
the upper management of these firms controls them from outside owners. This was 
observed in the Czech Republic (King 2001). 
(8) RESTITUTION. In some cases the legal title of some enterprises that had been nationalized 
by the Communist regime was returned to their original family of ownership. Another 
variant was to give vouchers to compensate for nationalized property that could be used 
to purchase other stocks. This was a very minor method overall.  
(9) GREENFIELD PRIVATIZATION. This is the strategy of not privatizing SOEs for quite a 
while, but creating conditions conducive to greenfield investment and the exit of 
inefficient firms. In essence, this allows a private sector to grow up around a state owned 
sector, until the country “outgrows the plan.” This is the dominant method in China.  
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APPENDIX C: BEST ESTIMATE OF EXTENT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM 
 
Country    Mass privatization scheme  Coding 
Albania   Never implemented  No 
Armenia  75% medium and large enterprises   Yes 
Azerbaijan  Less than 10% of firms by assets   No 
Belarus Never  implemented  No 
Bulgaria  Never implemented   No 
Croatia  Very small program (225,000 people) in residual state 
holdings in 15% of enterprises 
No 
Czech Republic  33% of assets of all firms  Yes 
Estonia Never  implemented  No 
Georgia  50% of medium and large enterprises  Yes 
Hungary Never  implemented  No 
Kazakhstan  60% of large enterprises   Yes 
Kyrgyz Rep  50% of medium and large enterprises   Yes 
Latvia  About 40% of large or medium enterprises   Yes 
Lithuania  About 45% of all enterprise assets  Yes 
Macedonia  Never implemented   No 
Moldova  40-50% of assets  Yes 
Poland  About 10% of assets  No 
Romania  About 38% of medium and large enterprises  Yes 
Russia  More than 80% of the industrial workforce  Yes 
Slovakia  About 10-15% (all while part of Czechoslovakia)   No 
Slovenia Never  implemented  No 
Tajikistan Never  implemented  No 
Turkmenistan Never  implemented  No 
Ukraine  About 44% of medium and large enterprises   Yes 
Uzbekistan Never  implemented  No 
Notes: Mass privatization = privatization by vouchers alone or in combination with management and 
employee buyouts (see Appendix B for descriptions). Sources: Country descriptions, all years of 
Transition Report (EBRD 1994-2005). 
 APPENDIX D 
TABLE D1 
INITIAL CONDITIONS AND MASS PRIVATIZATION 
 




Rule of law  -0.045 
(0.058) 
Quality of bureaucracy  -0.23 
(0.19) 
Civil society  0.019 
(0.096) 
Defense spending  0.054 
(0.037) 
Industrial distortion  -0.026 
(0.028) 
Trade distortion  -0.0097 
(0.016) 










* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
 
Notes: The first four institutional indices measure transparency of policymaking and 
accountability of the executive, quality of law enforcement, quality of the local bureaucracy, 
civil liberties, political rights and the influence of civic organizations based on Campos and 
Nugent (1999). See Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) for more details. Black market exchange 
measures the difference between black market exchange rates and official exchange rates in 
1990. Defense spending is defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the late 1980s. 
Industrial distortion is the sum of distortions in agriculture, industry and services sectors. 
Distortion was measured as the deviation from the share of GDP in these sectors versus the 
average share for market economies with comparable GDP per capita in purchasing-power-
parity. Trade distortion is the distortion from expected trade/GDP in market economies minus 
the sum of external trade/GDP, external trade within FSU as a share of GDP and external 
trade with socialist countries as a share of GDP. Both trade and industry distortion measures 
were calculated by Popov (2000) for 1990. WEB APPENDIX 
 
TABLE W1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF FIRM-LEVEL MEASURES OF PERCEIVED STATE CAPACITY 
 
  Likelihood of Weak State Capacity 
Country Barter  Bribe  Government 
Inefficiency 
Insecure Contracts and 
Property Rights 
Unofficial Payments to 
Public Officials 
Albania  0.00 0.64  0.64  0.47  0.39 
Armenia  0.18 0.32  0.84  0.42  0.44 
Azerbaijan  0.22 0.71  0.54  0.31  0.46 
Belarus  0.68 0.28  0.48  0.55  0.24 
Bosnia  0.61 0.53  0.79  0.36  0.34 
Bulgaria  0.34 0.54  0.75  0.42  0.25 
Croatia  0.90 0.50  0.61  0.35  0.17 
Czech Rep.  0.26 0.26  0.69  0.54  0.38 
Estonia  0.51 0.48  0.43  0.23  0.28 
Georgia  0.28 0.57  0.59  0.40  0.72 
Hungary  0.10 0.26  0.63  0.27  0.25 
Kazakhstan  0.58 0.36  0.75  0.59  0.37 
Kyrgyzstan  0.53 0.70  0.74  0.69  0.50 
Latvia  0.38 0.65  0.66  0.58  0.19 
Lithuania  0.24 0.46  0.85  0.65  0.37 
Macedonia  0.43 0.45  0.73  0.52  0.31 
Moldova  0.76 0.59  0.85  0.76  0.47 
Poland  0.34 0.53  0.49  0.24  0.21 
Serbia  0.54 0.71  0.42  0.26  0.08 
Romania  0.27 0.62  0.72  0.43  0.34 
Russia  0.69 0.56  0.77  0.73  0.36 
Slovakia  0.41 0.52  0.72  0.36  0.40 
Slovenia  0.86 0.26  0.44  0.26  0.32 
Ukraine  0.68 0.60  0.77  0.74  0.57 
Uzbekistan 0.32 0.30  0.43  0.23  0.54 
Source: World Bank/EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, 1999/2000. 
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REPLICATION USING EBRD AVERAGE PRIVATIZATION INDEX 
 
As a robustness check to our basic findings, we also evaluated the effects of the EBRD’s 
subjective indices on progress in privatization drawn from the EBRD Transition Indicator 
database. These EBRD indicators range from 1 (planned) to 4.3 (advanced market). Because 
their small- and large-scale indices are so highly correlated (r >0.97 in most countries) as to be 
statistically indistinguishable, following Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) we used an average of these 
indices to reduce measurement errors. 
 
TABLE W2 
EFFECT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION ON REAL GDP PER CAPITA, 1990-2000 
 
   FSU   non-FSU 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 


















































































Country-year trends  No  No  Yes    No  No  Yes 
Nation-years 150  150  150    103  103  103 
Nations 15  15  15    10  10  10 
R
2-within 0.254  0.582  0.751    0.130  0.611  0.805 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling; fixed 
effects models presented, as unobserved country fixed effects cannot be assumed to be exogenous to the mass 
privatization-growth relationship (Hausman-Taylor χ
2(1) = 46.89, p<0.0001). These fixed effects correct for the 
effects of oil and initial GDP. Real GDP per capita is expressed as a percentage of 1990 GDP. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
  